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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. When statutory offenses require a "lawful arrest" or a 
"lawful order", does the trial court err if it does not dismiss 
(or does not decide as a matter of law) that the officers' 
warrantless entry into a private residence was improper due to 
the lack of probable cause and exigent circumstances? (R 23-3 0; 
563-78) (issue preserved). 
"A trial court's ruling on a motion to dismiss is a question 
of law. Therefore, this court reviews the trial court's decision 
for correctness, with no particular deference to its legal 
conclusions." State v. Taylor, 884 P.2d 1293, 1295 (Utah App. 
1994) (citation omitted); State v. Swapp, 808 P.2d 115, 120 (Utah 
App.), cert, denied, 815 P.2d 241 (Utah 1991) ("When examining a 
trial court's interpretation of a statutory provision we apply a 
correction of error standard"); Grayson Roper Ltd. v. Finlinson, 
782 P.2d 467, 460 (Utah 1989) ("A trial court's legal conclusions 
are accorded no particular deference"). 
2. Did the trial court fail to recognize that whether or 
not "probable cause" existed (and other legal matters) are 
preliminary legal determinations for the court and that a jury 
should not be instructed to decide such non-factual issues? (R 
660-61) (issue preserved). 
"Determining the propriety of jury instructions presents a 
question of law, which we review under a correction of error 
standard." Laws v. Blanding City, 893 P.2d 1083, 1084 (Utah App. 
1995) . 
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^ ' - es llaussler responded to the dispatched 
message, although he conceded at trial and at the preliminary 
hearing that "sometimes the information that's transmitted to 
[him] from the dispatch is not accurate" or reliable. (R 403). 
Officer Haussler did not personally contact Mr. Ashley Read, nor 
did the officer ever talk to the Murray dispatch (who later had 
transmitted additional information to the Salt Lake County 
Sheriff's dispatch, who in turn then recommunicated such claims 
to officer Haussler). (R 402). 
Officer Haussler was directed to 2395 East 4500 South. (R 
373). After he knocked on the door, a young boy answered and 
identified himself as Mr. Griego's son. (R 374, 403) (David 
Griego is approximately 15 years of age). David told the officer 
"that Julie [Pierce] was his father's girlfriend, that they were 
not home at that time. And he did not know where they were or 
when they would return." (R 374, 622-23). 
There was no green pickup truck parked at the residence. (R 
374). Officer Haussler departed. (R 374). 
"Shortly before midnight, [the officer was] told that the 
subject pickup was parked in front of that address." (R 374). 
Officer Haussler went to the location where he was met by Deputy 
Bertram who "had a ride-along that night", Todd Sisneros. (R 
3 75). The officers returned to the house after "about a half 
hour, a little bit more[.]" (R 452). 
When the officers approached the front door, which was open, 
Mr. Griego was sitting on the couch and holding a can of beer. 
(R 377). The officers, however, had not yet asked him his name 
and they did not seek his identity until after he was outside. 
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(R 406). Mr. Griego's daughter, Cara, was up by the door at the 
time. (R 376). 
David and Cara Griego, Danny's children, testified that the 
officers told their dad to come outside. (R 612). He responded, 
"Why? What's the problem?" (R 612). The officers replied, 
"Come out. You don't ask questions; we'll ask the questions." 
(R 641). The officer then added, "If you don't come out, we'll 
come in and get you." (R 612, 641) . 
By comparison, officer Haussler claimed that he asked "a 
third time to step outside and speak with me and he [Danny] 
became very foul and verbally abusive." (R 408). "Fuck you" was 
the reported response. (R 379, 407) -1 The officers still were 
outside the threshold of the door. 
According to officer Haussler, Mr. Griego "appeared 
intoxicated. He was rather loose, bleary-eyed." (R 378). The 
officer did not recall asking specifically about Julie, although 
he remembered telling Mr. Griego that he wanted to talk to him 
about the domestic violence allegation. (R 378-79; 392) (officer 
Haussler did not ask where Julie was). Haussler "wasn't sure if 
there had been an assault or not and [he] could not get any 
information from [Danny] to find that out." (R 453). 
Mr. Griego started to get up, but the officers reacted 
1
 Such an alleged response occurred either after the first 
request or after the third request. (R 379, 408). Even 
assuming, arguendo, that an expletive had been used, a swear word 
does not establish an exigency (nor probable cause). There is no 
question that the officers made a warrantless entry into the 
home. (R 380). 
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impatiently. Without having had their questions answered, 
officer Haussler and deputy Bertram both crossed the threshold of 
Danny Griego's residence (entering through his door) and they 
grabbed Mr. Griego by the arms. (R 613, 626). 
after the third or fourth time that he refused, at the 
time I [officer Haussler] decided to help him out. I 
walked into the room, I put my arm down to help him up 
by his arm. He snatched his arm away and deputy Bertram 
at that time took his other arm and we both took an arm 
and walked him out of the front door. 
(R 380, 472) (officer Haussler's testimony). 
The officers dragged Mr. Griego out of the house by the 
arms. (R 613). One officer, who had twisted Danny's arm up 
against his back, continued to exert so much pressure that Mr. 
Griego screamed, "put the cuffs on me; don't break my arms. 
Arrest me[.]" (R 614, 642). David Griego said his father did 
not kick at the officers, (R 627), although the State claimed 
that when the officers bent Danny over the hood of the police 
car, Danny started kicking and calling them names. (R 384); (R 
411) (Haussler said there was no kicking in the house); cf. (R 
453) (when the officer had Mr. Griego on the hood of the police 
car, he was being arrested only for intoxication and disorderly 
conduct--two charges which the State declined to file). 
Officer Haussler is 6'6" tall and weighs "285, 290" pounds. 
(R 412). Deputy Bertram is 6'4" tall and weighs 220 pounds. (R 
412). Danny Griego is 5'10" tall and weighs 150 pounds. (R 
413) . 
Cara Griego took pictures of what the officers were doing to 
her father. (R 615, 643). Not wanting their actions recorded, 
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the officers first told her to go away. They later grabbed her 
head and slammed her face against the hood of the police car. (R 
615, 645). 
Mr. Griego, who was in the front seat of the police car at 
the time, saw his daughter being roughed up and he tried to open 
the door to help her. (R 616, 629). Two officers immediately 
restrained Danny, however, as they went into the back seat of the 
police car and choked him from behind with a nightstick. (R 616, 
620, 646, 653). Mr. Griego's flailing legs hit the dashboard of 
the car as he struggled to free himself from the officers' choke 
hold. (R 629). Blood was "running down his [Danny's] chest and 
his face and he was just being wrenched back really far." (R 
617) . 
During the incident, Julie Pierce was safely situated in the 
Griego residence. (R 652). The officers did not articulate a 
basis for their actions towards Mr. Griego, even admitting that 
they did not ask about Julie's whereabouts, (R 378-79; 392, 453), 
and that they "decided to help him [Danny] out" of the house 
because he had not responded to their inquiries. (R 380). After 
the incident was over, the officers still made no attempt to 
interview Julie. (R 570). 
The case at bar is only one of many incidents in which 
officer Haussler responded impatiently. Haussler's rash behavior 
in an unrelated domestic violence case prompted one of the 
participants to file a civil suit against Haussler for using 
unreasonable force. (R 444-45). Although Haussler claimed that 
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the complainant there allegedly assaulted and interfered with the 
arresting officer [Haussler], the charges were later dismissed in 
exchange for the complainant's agreement to drop his civil case 
against Salt Lake County [which employs officer Haussler]. (R 
444-45) . Haussler attempted to discount the incident, claiming 
that the State could not locate the victim. (R 444-45) . 
On or about June 11, 1991, officer Haussler again used 
excessive force in response to an altercation. (R 581-83) . When 
Haussler arrived on the scene, Mr. Greg Farrer attempted to tell 
the officer that he was the one who had called police for help. 
(R 583). He reported a neighbor had fired a gun. Mr. Farrer was 
seen carrying a golf club. Rather than pausing long enough to 
hear Farrer's explanation, officer Haussler forcibly subdued Greg 
by hitting him on the genitals with a flashlight. (R 583-84). 
Greg collapsed on the police car. (R 584). 
In another incident on or about August 4, 1992, David 
Foulger had a party for his sixteen-year old daughter. (R 596-
97). In response to a neighbor's complaint about the birthday 
party getting out of hand, officer Haussler went to the Foulger 
residence and said, "It's time for everybody to go home." (R 
597-98). Mr. Foulger accepted officer Haussler's position, 
characterizing the meeting as a "friendly encounter". (R 598). 
Approximately ten or fifteen minutes later, however, officer 
Haussler walked into Mr. Foulger's residence through the back 
door. (R 598). Haussler did not request or receive permission 
to enter the residence. Mr. Foulger told Haussler, "Sir, I 
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believe you need a warrant to come into my house. (R 598). 
Mr. Foulger pointed to the door and asked the officer to 
leave. Haussler grabbed his wrist, threw him to the ground, and 
put a knee in the back of Mr. Foulger's head. (R 600). The 
officer broke Mr. Foulger's glasses when he shoved his face into 
the carpet. (R 600). Haussler handcuffed Mr. Foulger and took 
him to jail. 
The State there attempted to defend officer Haussler's 
warrantless entry by arguing that the party was attended by kids 
who had lined the street. (R 605). Kids were running 
everywhere, the State argued, and Haussler chased a kid into the 
house. (R 606). No other explanation was advanced in support of 
the officer's warrantless entry. 
All charges filed against Mr. Foulger were dropped except 
for one. (R 601) (a plea was entered for contributing to the 
delinquency of minors; all others were dismissed [i.e. supplying 
alcoholic beverages to minors, interfering with an officer making 
a lawful arrest, and intoxication]). Officer Haussler also 
arrested Mr. Foulger's wife and handcuffed her in her pajamas 
because she awoke and yelled obscenities. All charges against 
her, which included more charges than those filed against her 
husband, were also dismissed. (R 602) . 
The issues in Mr. Griego's appeal center on the propriety of 
the officers actions and whether the trial court should have 
first decided legal matters before factual disputes were 
submitted to the jury. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
As interpreted in State v. Gardiner, 814 P.2d 568 (Utah 
1991), the "assault on a peace officer" statute and a 1981 
version of the "interference with a peace officer" statute 
require peace officers to show that they were merely "acting 
within the scope of their authority" or simply "seeking to effect 
a lawful arrest". Citizens may not interfere with or commit an 
assault upon such officers even if the officers actions are later 
determined to be illegal. 
By contrast, the language applicable to the "assault by a 
prisoner" statute and a 1990 version of the "interference with a 
peace officer" statute requires proof that there was in fact a 
"lawful order" or a "lawful arrest". The statutory mandate is no 
longer satisfied by officers who initially attempt to "act" or 
"seek" in furtherance of their duties, and who then subsequently 
learn that their actions were unlawful. Under existing 
authority, the State now must prove that a "lawful order" or a 
"lawful arrest" did in fact exist at the outset. 
Three of the four counts contained such statutory 
requirements. The officers warrantless entry was not supported 
by either probable cause or exigent circumstances. Due to the 
absence of a valid exception to the warrant requirement, the 
initial unlawful police action prevented the State from proving 
that Mr. Griego was "in custody pursuant to a lawful arrest" and 
that he interfered "by refusing to perform any act required by a 
lawful order". 
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The statutory requirements of a "lawful order" or a "lawful 
arrest" were not met. The trial court erred when it did not 
dismiss the involved counts. 
The court also erred when it declined to rule on a legal 
matter and when it submitted non-factual determinations to the 
jury. Threshold legal determinations such as whether "probable 
cause" existed or whether the unfiled charges of "intoxication" 
and "disorderly conduct" existed are questions of law for the 
court. By leaving such questions for the jury, the lower court 




THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE GRANTED MR, GRIEGO'S 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
Following the State's case-in-chief, Mr. Griego moved to 
dismiss the four alleged counts. (R 563). The lower court 
amended one count, the criminal mischief allegation, due to the 
lack of sufficient evidence. (R 577). However, it otherwise 
denied Mr. Griego's motion. (R 578). "A trial court's ruling on 
a motion to dismiss is a question of law. Therefore, this court 
reviews the trial court's decision for correctness, with no 
particular deference to its legal conclusions." State v. Taylor, 
884 P.2d 1293, 1295 (Utah App. 1994) (citation omitted). 
The State alleged two counts of "assault by a prisoner"; one 
dealt with deputy Bertram, the other with deputy Haussler. (R 
203, 220, 221, 223); Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.5. The charges 
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alleged, inter alia, that Mr. Griego "was a prisoner in the 
custody of a peace officer pursuant to lawful arrest, and 
assaulted [the deputy], intending to do bodily injury to [the 
deputy], with unlawful force or violence." (R 203) (emphasis 
added) (Addendum B); see also (R 203) (another count, 
"interference with a peace officer making a lawful arrest" 
required the State to show that Danny interfered "by refusing to 
perform any act required by a lawful order made by a peace 
officer. . .") (emphasis added) (Addendum B). 
Relying on State v. Gardiner, 814 P.2d 568 (Utah 1991), the 
State here argued that the assault by a prisoner statute applied. 
An assault upon an officer is not allowed, the State claimed, 
even if the search is later determined to be illegal. (R 575). 
However, the Gardiner opinion is distinguishable from the case at 
bar and a proper reading actually supports Danny Griego's 
position. As discussed below, in the instant case the State 
first must establish a lawful arrest or a lawful order because 
the statutes used here are different from those used in Gardiner. 
Three of the four allegations in the present case require 
proof of a "lawful arrest" or a "lawful order". (R 203, 218, 
220, 221, 223); Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-5-102.5; 76-8-305 (1992). 
By contrast, there were no such statutory requirements in 
Gardiner. See 814 P.2d at 574 (citing Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-5-
102.4; 76-8-305 (1981) ) .2 
2
 The incident in Gardiner occurred on April 17, 1988. 814 
P.2d at 569. As stated by the opinion, the statute then in 
existence read, "A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if 
12 
In Gardiner, officers responded to a complaint about a loud 
party in progress. One officer approached a doorway and "smelled 
a strong odor of alcohol and saw several people within the 
building whom he believed to be minors." 814 P.2d at 569. The 
officer, who did not have a search warrant, was confronted by a 
"hostile and threatening" person (Gardiner). Id. at 575. The 
officer pushed Gardiner away from the door and a fight ensued. 
One charged offense in Gardiner, "assault on a peace 
officer", stated: "Any person who assaults a peace officer, with 
knowledge that he [or she] is a peace officer, and when the peace 
he [or she] has knowledge, or by the exercise of reasonable care, 
should have knowledge, that a peace officer is seeking to effect 
a lawful arrest or detention of himself [or herself] or another 
and interferes with such arrest or detention by use of force or 
by use of any weapon." Id. at 575 (emphasis added); Addendum A. 
The 1988 incident was prohibited by the above statutory language, 
which was enacted originally in 1981 and remained in force until 
April 22, 1990. See Addendum A. The Gardiner opinion, however, 
mistakenly cited Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-305 (Supp. 1990), as 
authority, see 814 P.2d at 575, when in fact the 1990 amendment 
did not become effective until April 23, 1990. See Addendum A. 
The 1990 amendment essentially reiterates the 1981 version 
although two subsections were added as alternatives to the above 
underscored clause. In addition to the underscored clause, such 
interference currently occurs by: 
(2) the arrested person's refusal to perform any act 
required by lawful order: 
(a) necessary to effect the arrest or detention; and 
(b) made by a peace officer involved in the arrest or 
detention; or 
(3) the arrested person's or another person's refusal to 
refrain from performing any act that would impede the arrest 
or detention. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-305(2), -(3) (emphasis added). In short, 
because the 1990 statutory amendments were not at issue in 
Gardiner, the recently enacted subsection (2) requirement of a 
"lawful order" imposes a new element not previously considered in 
Utah and not proven in the case at bar. 
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officer is acting within the scope of his [or her] authority as a 
peace officer, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor." Id. (citing 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.4); see also Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-503 
(1981) (the other charge in Gardiner, interfering with a peace 
officer, did not contain the "lawful order" element which is now 
required by the present version of the statute); see supra note 
2. The Gardiner opinion focused on whether the officer was 
"acting within the scope of his [or her] authority as a peace 
officer" and whether he was "seeking to effect a lawful arrest". 
814 P.2d at 574-76. 
Noteworthy, though, is that the supreme court expressly 
found that the assault on a peace officer "statute does not 
require that the State prove that the precise act the officer is 
performing is not legally challengeable, i.e., that the arrest or 
search being effected is entirely lawful and beyond challenge." 
Gardiner, 814 P.2d at 574 (emphasis added). By comparison, proof 
of such an lawful arrest or order was in fact required for the 
charges relied upon below. (R 203, 218, 220, 221, 223). 
Thus, unlike in Gardiner where the unlawfulness of the 
search did not compromise the State's ability to enforce the 
plain language of the statutes, see 814 P.2d at 574 (citing Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 76-5-102.4; 76-8-305), the unlawfulness of the 
warrantless entry here eliminated the State's ability to prove a 
"lawful arrest" or "lawful order". (R 203, 218, 220, 221, 223) 
(Addendum B). 
Since "the arrest or search being effected [was not] 
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entirely lawful and [vulnerable to] challenge", the court should 
have granted Mr. Griego's motion to dismiss. The unlawful police 
conduct prevented the State from invoking the assault by a 
prisoner statute or the revised edition of the interfering with a 
peace officer statute. Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-5-101, -102.5; 76-8-
3 05; see supra note 2. 
There is no question that the police entered the Griego 
residence without permission. (R 23-25; 308; 472; 564; 573-74; 
625-26). The preliminary issue is whether the "per se 
unreasonable" designation remains applicable to the officers' 
warrantless entry. Gardiner, 814 P.2d at 571. 
"It is a 'basis principle of Fourth Amendment law' that 
searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are 
presumptively unreasonable." Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 
587 (1980); U.S. Const, amend. IV. "[P]hysical entry of the home 
is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth 
Amendment is directed." State v. Beavers, 859 P.2d 9, 13 (Utah 
App. 1993) (citation omitted). "[T]he Fourth Amendment has drawn 
a firm line at the entrance to the house." Payton, 445 U.S. at 
590; accord United States v. Winsor, 846 F.2d 1569 (9th Cir. 
1988) (the suspect's location is the focus, "[o]therwise, 
arresting officers could avoid illegal 'entry' into a home simply 
by remaining outside the doorway. . . " ) . 
Due to the officers warrantless entry, "the State must prove 
the circumstances of the present case fall within one of the 
'jealously and carefully drawn' exceptions to the warrant 
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requirement . . . ." State v. Lee, 633 P.2d 48, 61 (Utah 1981) 
(footnote omitted). The State must prove the existence of both 
probable cause and exigent circumstances. State v. Ashe, 745 
P.2d 1255, 1259 (Utah 1987); Beavers, 859 P.2d at 14. 
A. THE STATE DID NOT ESTABLISH PROBABLE CAUSE 
Two opinions lend analogous guidance to the probable cause 
determination. See State v. Case, 884 P.2d 1274 (Utah App. 
1994); State v. White, 856 P.2d 656 (Utah App. 1993). 
Importantly, even though probable cause is the required standard 
of proof for Mr. Griego's case, the following circumstances in 
Case and White were not enough to establish the lesser standard 
of reasonable suspicion. Cf. State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616 
(Utah 1987) (per curiam) (a heightened showing of probable cause 
is required to justify a "level three" intrusion, although 
officers still must articulate a reasonable suspicion for "level 
two" seizures); Case, 884 P.2d at 1276 ("While the required level 
of suspicion is lower than the standard required for probable -
cause to arrest, the same totality of facts and circumstances 
approach is used to determine if there are sufficient "specific 
and articulable facts" to support reasonable suspicion"). 
In State v. Case, 884 P.2d 1274 (Utah App. 1994), this Court 
held, inter alia, that a "possible car prowl" bulletin which 
merely gave a location and a suspect's description3 "wholly 
3
 The trial court in Case found: "1. On June 26, 1992, 
University of Utah Police Officer [Lefavor] was dispatched to a 
suspected car prowl, or vehicle burglary, in a common parking 
area at the 100 court of the University Village sometime after 
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fail[ed] to establish the department's reasonable, articulable 
suspicion" for the dispatched report. Id. at 1278. "Merely 
providing descriptive information to an officer about whom to 
stop, by itself, is not enough to justify the stop if there are 
no articulable facts pointed to which establish why a stop was to 
be made." Id. (emphasis in original). 
An officer may rely objectively on information from other 
sources, but "if the investigating officer cannot provide 
independent or corroborating information through his or her own 
observations, the legality of a stop based on information 
imparted by another will depend on the sufficiency of the 
articulable facts known to the individual originating the 
information or bulletin subsequently received and acted upon by 
the investigating officer." Case, 884 P.2d at 1277 (emphasis in 
original). The officer in Case "corroborated dispatch's 
information by stopping an individual in the area who appeared to 
match the physical description given[, . . . but] [t]his is not 
corroboration of criminal activity, only of physical 
characteristics that by themselves have no relevance to criminal 
activity." Id. at 1279. 
As in Case where the officer responded to a dispatched 
report of a "possible car prowl", 884 P.2d at 1278, officer 
Haussler similarly responded to a dispatched report of a 
midnight. 2. The dispatcher gave Officer [Lefavor] the following 
description of the suspect: a chunky male, possible Hispanic, 
wearing a white t-shirt. These were the only details provided by 
the dispatcher. 3. The officer did not know who had phoned in 
the complaint." 884 P.2d at 1278. 
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"possible assault or domestic violence situation." (R 370). 
Unlike in Case, however, officer Haussler did not have a physical 
description of a suspect. Haussler heard that a white and green 
chevy was involved, but the officer never received a description 
of Mr. Griego. Even upon their encounter, officer Haussler never 
asked Mr. Griego his name and he failed to obtain Danny's 
identity until after they were outside. (R 406). 
The underlying basis for the dispatched report was 
inadequate, as "the State becomes obligated, albeit after the 
fact, to show that legally sufficient articulable suspicion 
prompted issuance of the flyer or dispatch in the first place." 
Case, 884 P.2d at 1277-78 n.5. No independent corroborating 
evidence existed. 
Indeed, officer Haussler conceded that when he approached 
the front door, Mr. Griego was merely "sitting on the couch. He 
was holding a can of beer." (R 377). "To me [Haussler,] he 
[Danny] appeared intoxicated. He was rather loose, bleary-eyed." 
(R 378). Danny Griego said nothing, however, until only after 
the officers had told him to come out. (R 378-79; 612, 641). 
The circumstances then in existence gave no support 
whatsoever to any of the allegations transmitted through 
dispatch. Cf. State v. White, 856 P.2d 656, 666 (Utah App. 1993) 
("On-scene observations allowed the officers to make a positive 
identification of the suspect, but they did not indicate present 
or intended criminal activity"). At best, officer Haussler 
stated, "I explained why we were there and that I wanted to talk 
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to him about domestic violence." (R 378). However, the officer 
did not ask specifically about Julie, (R 379), and no persons 
appeared injured nor in danger. 
The record is devoid of any suggestion of an argument, loud 
noises, or a disturbance of any kind at the Griego residence. 
David and Cara Griego were okay, as was Julie Pierce, (R 652), 
although the police failed to discern that fact because they 
reacted hastily when Mr. Griego did not respond to their liking. 
(R 308); cf. White, 856 P.2d at 664 ("unfounded allegations of 
attenuated domestic violence should [not] justify an immediate 
frisk when nothing the officers observe upon encountering the 
suspect supports any suspicion of present danger as the result of 
past participation in a domestic quarrel"); People v. Abbott, 84 
Cal.Rptr. 40, 43 (Cal. App. 1970) ("The required corroboration 
must relate to essential fact. . . . Facts which are unrelated 
to a criminal activity on the part of defendant are insufficient 
to provide that corroboration of an untested declarant which is 
required"). 
State v. White, 856 P.2d 656 (Utah App. 1993), further 
reflects that the officer's actions were not supported by 
probable cause. The officers there investigated a domestic 
disturbance complaint which also alleged the use of cocaine. The 
complainant, a former wife of the defendant, claimed that earlier 
in the day White had been involved in a domestic disturbance; 
that he was on parole for armed robbery; that he was high on 
cocaine at the time, and that he was violating his parole by 
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using cocaine. 856 P.2d at 657. 
The investigating officer, who recognized White as a former 
prison inmate, noticed him in a car "kind of leaning off to his 
side a little bit." Id. at 660. White wore a heavy coat, but 
the officer acknowledged that he did not appear to be armed. Id. 
at 658. 
Holding that the frisk was improper (and that the resulting 
evidence should have been suppressed), this Court held, "the 
totality of available information must sustain an officer's 
reasonable suspicion of both criminal activity and danger 
throughout the initial investigatory stages of the encounter and 
until the frisk actually commenced." White, 856 P.2d at 662; see 
also id. at 665 ("we must remember that authority to permit a 
protective frisk for weapons 'must be narrowly drawn'"). 
If the circumstances in White failed to satisfy the 
reasonable suspicion standard necessary for a frisk, the 
circumstances here fell far short of establishing probable cause. 
Cf. Case, 884 P.2d at 1276. 
The White and Griego situation both contained allegations of 
a domestic disturbance. Cf. White, 856 P.2d at 662 ("although 
the third party informant was named, the officers had no 
experience with defendant's former spouse which would allow them 
to assume the accuracy of the information she gave them and they 
did no independent investigation which would assist them in 
assessing its accuracy"). Notwithstanding the White officer's 
first-hand recognition and corroboration of the suspect as a 
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former prison inmate who was on parole for armed robbery, the 
investigating officer's frisk still was deemed improper. 856 
P.2d at 664-66; cf. State v. Albrecht, 465 N.W.2d 107 (Minn. App. 
1991) ("the facts corroborated were easily obtained facts and 
conditions which by themselves are inadequate to support a 
finding of probable cause"). 
More compelling than in White, the officer here failed at 
the outset to even confirm Mr. Griego's identity. (R 4 06). At 
least in White, the defendant wore a heavy coat which arguably 
had the potential to conceal a weapon. 856 P.2d at 661. Danny 
Griego was seen holding a can of beer. (R 377). 
One admitted distinction exists, though, in that defendant 
White was cooperative while Mr. Griego questioned the officers. 
However, such an inquiry or even a spewing of expletives, (R 3 79, 
407, 612), adds nothing to the probable cause determination. See 
State v. Talbot, 792 P.2d 489, 494 (Utah App. 1991) (quoting 
McClain v. State, 408 So.2d 721, 722 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) 
(defendant's "behavior which, taken for its most insidious 
implications, indicated only that he wanted to avoid police, [and 
did] not give rise to a reasonable suspicion that he was engaged 
in criminal activity")). 
Since the lesser standard of reasonable suspicion did not 
exist, the probable cause requirement was similarly lacking. The 
warrantless entry was improper. 
B. THE STATE DID NOT ESTABLISH EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES 
Since probable cause and exigent circumstances are separate 
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requirements, proof of one does not relieve the State of its 
burden to prove the other. State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255, 1259 
(Utah 1987); State v. Beavers, 859 P.2d 9, 14 (Utah App. 1993); 
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 587-88 (1980) (citing with 
approval Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d 385 (1970) (en banc) 
("[A]bsent exigent circumstances, a warrantless entry to search 
for weapons or contraband is unconstitutional even when a felony 
has been committed and there is probable cause to believe that 
incriminating evidence with be found within")). 
Exigent circumstances are those "that would cause a 
reasonable person to believe that entry . . . was 
necessary to prevent physical harm to the officers or 
other persons, the destruction of relevant evidence, the 
escape of the suspect, or some other consequence 
improperly frustrating legitimate law enforcement 
efforts." "The need for an immediate search must be 
apparent to the police, and so strong as to outweigh the 
important protection of individual rights provided by 
the warrant requirement." 
State v. Beavers, 859 P.2d 9, 18 (Utah App. 1993) (citations 
omitted). 
Moreover, the seriousness of the involved offense is not 
necessarily determinative. See Mincey, 43 7 U.S. at 3 95 (where 
the court "decline[d] to hold that the seriousness of the offense 
[murder] under investigation itself creates exigent circumstances 
of the kind that under the Fourth Amendment justify a warrantless 
search"). 
Except for the fact that the offense under 
investigation was a homicide, there were no exigent 
circumstances in this case, . . . There was no 
indication that evidence would be lost, destroyed or 
removed during the time required to obtain a search 
warrant. Indeed, the police guard at the apartment 
minimized that possibility. And there is no 
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suggestion that a search warrant could not easily and 
conveniently have been obtained. 
Mincey, 437 U.S. at 394 (citations omitted). 
The officers here were investigating a possible domestic 
disturbance or assault, yet there was no reason for them not to 
obtain a warrant. They already had been once to the Griego 
residence; there was a delay of "about a half hour, a little bit 
more" before their return, (R 452); and over an hour had elapsed 
since the time of the originating complaint. (R 374, 461) (the 
first police call came "between 10:00 and 11:00" p.m.; their 
second visit to the house occurred "just before midnight"). 
Not only did the lapse of time lessen the exigency, if any, 
when the officers approached the front door they heard and saw 
nothing to indicate a past or present altercation. (R 375-76); 
cf. Beavers, 859 P.2d at 16 (citing State v. Davis, 295 Or. 227, 
666 P.2d 802, 812 (1983) (en banc) (no exigency, despite a report 
of "an ongoing rape", when officers arrived at the scene and such 
a situation was not evident); United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 
221 (1985) ("exigent circumstances which require a police officer 
to step in before a crime is committed or completed are not 
necessarily as pressing long afterwards"). 
Danny Griego "was sitting on a couch . . . holding a can of 
beer." (R 377). He posed no threat. The officers could see 
inside the residence and despite Haussler's contention that he 
"wanted to separate he [Danny] and Juliet,]11 Julie was not in the 
front room at the time. (R 376-78) . Cf. Beavers, 859 P.2d at 16 
(citing Davis, 666 P.2d at 812 (no exigency when officers claim 
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that they "need to 'neutralize' the area for their own protection 
while carrying on the questioning")). 
Danny never even made furtive movements. Cf. White, 856 
P.2d at 661 (citing State v. Schlosser, 774 P.2d 1132, 1138 (Utah 
1989) (finding no reasonable suspicion of criminal activity based 
only on furtive gestures and fidgeting appearance)). 
At best, officer Haussler claimed that he saw "shadows 
against the far wall." (R 378). However, such an inarticulate 
and unsubstantiated allegation falls well short of the heightened 
probable cause standard. Cf. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 
471, 474, 478 (1963) (where, in response to the officer's 
presence, defendant Toy "immediately 'slammed the door and 
started running' down the hallway" there was "nothing in the 
circumstances occurring at Toy's premises that would provide 
sufficient justification for his arrest without a warrant"); 
accord Beavers, 859 P.2d at 18 (citation omitted) (in order for a 
"very dangerous scenario" to constitute an exigency, "[t]here 
must be no practical way to avoid these risks [to the involved 
persons or law enforcement] and yet follow the Constitution's 
mandate of detached judicial supervision of such intrusions"). 
Two officers, one being 6'6", 285 pounds and the other 
amounting to 6'4", 220 pounds, stood guard at Mr. Griego's door. 
See Mincey, 43 7 U.S. at 3 94. Their view was unobstructed and no 
one appeared to be in danger. There was no valid reason for the 
police not to obtain a (telephonic) warrant. Cf. State v. 
Palmer, 803 P.2d 1249, 1253 (Utah App. 1990) ("In light of the 
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comparative ease with which a warrant can be obtained under 
Utah's telephonic warrant statute, little or no impediment is 
presented to police investigations"). There was no exigency. 
C. THE UNLAWFULNESS OF THE WARRANTLESS ENTRY 
REQUIRED THE TRIAL COURT TO DISMISS THE ALLEGED 
COUNTS 
Since neither probable cause nor exigent circumstances 
existed, the lower court should have granted Mr. Griego's motion 
to dismiss. (R 564). The State had not proven that Mr. Griego 
"was a prisoner in the custody of a peace officer pursuant to fa] 
lawful arrest". (R 203) (emphasis added). The State similarly 
failed to establish that he unlawfully interfered "by refusing to 
perform any act required by a lawful order made by a peace 
officer". (R 202, 203) (emphasis added). 
The unjustified warrantless entry rendered the arrest and 
order unlawful. See supra Points I.A. & I.B; see also (R 4 53, 
566) (despite officer Haussler's contention that he had to cross 
the threshold to arrest Mr. Griego for intoxication and 
disorderly conduct, Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-9-102; 76-9-701, these 
statutes do not proscribe the circumstances which existed prior 
to their discussion); accord (R 377) (officer Haussler observed 
Danny Griego in a private residence quietly "sitting on a couch 
. . . holding a can of beer"); cf. (R 26) (citing Welsh v. 
Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 750 (1984) (even if such offenses were in 
fact established, the relative minor nature of misdemeanor 
offenses still do not allow an intrusion of the magnitude 
necessary for a warrantless entry)). 
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State v. Gardiner, 814 P.2d 568 (Utah 1991), also suggests 
factually that the "assault by a prisoner" charges should not 
have been used in the case at bar. (R 2 03). The State in 
Gardiner charged the defendant, who was "hostile and 
threatening", id. at 575, with the misdemeanor offense of 
assaulting a peace officer and the pre-amended version of 
interfering with an officer. Id. at 574-75; Utah Code Ann. §§ 
76-5-102.4; 76-8-305; see supra note 2. From the outset, 
defendant Gardiner was "physically confrontive" and he 
subsequently "charged" and repeatedly punched an officer in the 
face. 814 P.2d at 575. The officer there told Gardiner that he 
was under arrest and Gardiner responded by hitting him in the 
face. Id. 
By contrast, the State here charged the more passive Danny 
Griego with the more serious felony offenses of "assault by a 
prisoner". (R 203) (Counts III & IV); Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-
102.5. Arguably, even if Danny had sworn, he never got up to be 
physically confrontive. He remained on the couch, sipping a 
beer. (R 3 77). He did not charge or punch the officer; he was 
outmatched physically. (R 412-13). 
After the officers entered and twisted his arm up against 
his back, Danny pleaded with them to stop, even asking them to 
arrest him. (R 614, 642). He may have struggled, but the only 
time he reacted with any appreciable force was when the officers 
slammed his daughter on the hood of the police car. (R 616, 
629). The officers subdued Danny by choking him with a 
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nightstick. (R 616, 620, 646, 653). Since the more serious 
assault by a prisoner charge was not filed in Gardiner, it also 
should not have been filed here.4 
The trial court already had decided as a matter of law that 
the State had not proven the required statutory amount for one 
classification of criminal mischief. (R 7, 203, 576); Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-6-106 (the amount applicable to a class C misdemeanor 
is less than $250; the amount applicable to a class A misdemeanor 
is between $500-$l, 000) . 
Officer Haussler had testified that the estimated damage to 
the police car was $750-$l,500. (R 449, 575). However, because 
the more credible evidence was $178, (R 575), the trial court 
refused to submit the matter to the jury because "the testimony 
that puts it over the threshold amount is insufficient for any 
jury to base a verdict of guilty on." (R 576). The court erred 
in not also determining that the required elements for the other 
counts had not been proven. Mr. Griego's motion to dismiss 
should have been granted. (R 564). 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO MAKE A NECESSARY PRELIMINARY 
LEGAL DETERMINATION 
On a related issue, the trial court erred when it instructed 
4
 Having recognized the problems inherent in proving the 
"lawfulness" of the officers warrantless entry, see supra Points 
I.A. & I.B., defense counsel previously informed the prosecution 
that the lesser misdemeanor offense, assault on a peace officer, 
would be a more appropriate charge. (R 568). The prosecution 
declined. (R 568). 
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the jury to decide non-factual matters. (R 661). Rather than 
first determining as a matter of law whether "probable cause", 
"disorderly conduct", and "intoxication" existed, the court 
mistakenly allowed the jury to decide such preliminary legal 
questions. (R 226, 227, 228, 661) (Addendum C). 
"In a jury trial, questions of law are to be determined by 
the court, questions of fact by the jury." Utah Code Ann. § 77-
17-10(1). Officer Haussler claimed that he had to enter the 
Griego residence in order to arrest him for intoxication and 
disorderly conduct. (R 453, 566); Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-9-102; 
76-9-701. Neither charge, however, was filed against Danny 
Griego. (R 6-7; 202-03). More important, the court should have 
first decided whether probable cause for such offenses even 
existed. 
By submitting those matters to the jury, the court in 
essence abdicated its legal responsibility to determine whether 
the officers' actions were in fact grounded in law. Cf. State v. 
Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 787 (Utah 1991) ("the trial court bears 
the responsibility to resolve preliminary constitutional issues 
as to the admissibility of evidence, and it cannot abdicate this 
responsibility by de facto leaving the question to the jury"). 
State v. Payne, 892 P.2d 1032 (Utah 1995), provides 
additional analogous authority. The trial court there required 
the State to establish jurisdiction by proving: 
1. The offense occurred within the exterior boundaries 
of the State of Utah; and 2. the offense or some 
required element of the offense occurred outside the 
reservation. The issue of whether the State has met its 
28 
burden of proving the above is for the jury to decide. 
Id. at 1033. The State appealed and the supreme court reversed. 
Such preliminary legal determinations must first be decided 
by the court. Questions of law are not considerations for the 
jury. Id.; cf. Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 787 (reversal required 
because, inter alia, "rather than ruling on the earlier motions 
to suppress, the trial judge simply refrained from passing on the 
issue and let the evidence resulting from the stop and seizure go 
to the jury"). 
A judge's legal determination regarding the propriety of an 
officer's actions is a preliminary matter totally distinct from a 
jury's factual deliberations concerning the conduct of a 
defendant. Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-10(1). Especially when the 
facts are undisputed, the legal determination must be made by the 
court. See Zions Co-op. Mercantile Institution, 605 P.2d 314, 
320 (Utah 1979). 
The sequence of events which existed prior to the officers' 
warrantless entry is not in question. Officer Haussler responded 
to a "possible domestic violence or assault" complaint. (R 373). 
His first visit to the residence was uneventful, (R 374), and 
approximately an hour had passed before his return. (R 374, 
461); see supra Point I.A. (the legal sufficiency of the 
complaint is a question of law for the court). 
Undisputed is the fact that the officers crossed the 
threshold and entered a private residence. (R 23-25; 308; 472; 
564; 573-74; 625-26). The sole legal (as opposed to factual) 
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determination is whether the officers warrantless entry was 
justified. See Point I (had the trial court granted Mr. Griego's 
motion to dismiss, such legal issues would have been properly 
resolved and there would have been no impact on the jury 
deliberation process). 
The trial court erred when it denied the motion to dismiss 
and the error was compounded when the court gave to the jury 
legal matters which it should have determined itself at the 
outset. Instead of having to decide whether the officers had 
probable cause to arrest for intoxication and disorderly conduct, 
(R 225-28) (Addendum C), the jury should have only had to 
consider whether Danny7 s actions were proscribed. (R 218, 220, 
221) (Addendum D). 
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT AND A WRITTEN OPINION 
The case at bar presents a question of first impression. 
State v. Gardiner, 814 P.2d 568 (Utah 1991), does not govern 
Danny Griego's case, particularly because the offenses alleged 
here are different from those filed in Gardiner. Recent 
statutory amendments require a fresh interpretation from this 
Court. An opinion also is necessary to clarify the trial court's 
role when it is confronted with questions of law. 
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CONCLUSION 
Mr, Griego respectfully requests this Court to reverse his 
convictions. The unjustified warrantless police entry prevented 
the State from proving that the alleged statutory offenses 
applied. With the exception of the criminal mischief charge, all 
the remaining charges should have been dismissed. 
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[Unreasonable searches and seizures.] 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and 
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affir-
mation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons 
or things to be seized. 
76-5-101. "Prisoner" defined. 
For purposes of this part "prisoner" means any person who is in custody of 
a peace officer pursuant to a lawful arrest or who is confined in a jail or other 
penal institution or a facility used for confinement of delinquent juveniles 
operated by the Division of Youth Corrections regardless of whether the 
confinement is legal. 
76-5-102.4. Assault against peace officer. 
Any person who assaults a peace officer, with knowledge that he is a peace 
officer, and when the peace officer is acting within the scope of his authority as 
a peace officer, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
76-5-102.5. Assault by prisoner. 
ou^^t^gr^totending to cause boduy "*•* «• « • * * 
(1) A person commits criminal mischief if: 
(a) under circumstances not amounting to arson, he damages or de-
stroys property with the intention of defrauding an insurer; 
(b) he intentionally and unlawfully tampers with the property of 
another and thereby: 
(i) recklessly endangers human life; or 
(ii) recklessly causes or threatens a substantial interruption or 
impairment of any public utility service; 
(c) he intentionally damages, defaces, or destroys the property of 
another, including the use of graffiti as defined in Subsection 78-11-20(2); 
or 
(d) he recklessly or willfully shoots or propels a missile or other object 
at or against a motor vehicle, bus, airplane, boat, locomotive, t ra in , 
railway car or caboose, whether moving or standing. 
(2) (a) A violation of Subsection (l)(a) is a felony of the third degree. 
(b) A violation of Subsection (l)(b) is a class A misdemeanor. 
(c) Any other violation of this section is a: 
(i) felony of the third degree if the actor's conduct causes or is 
intended to cause pecuniary loss in excess of $1,000 value; 
(ii) class A misdemeanor if the actor's conduct causes or is intended 
to cause pecuniary loss in excess of $500; 
(iii) class B misdemeanor if the actor's conduct causes or is in-
tended to cause pecuniary loss in excess of $250; and 
(iv) class C misdemeanor if the actor's conduct causes or is in-
tended to cause loss of less than $250. 
76-8-305. Interference with peace officer mak-
ing lawful arrest. 
A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if he 
has knowledge, or by the exercise of reasonable care, 
should have knowledge, that a peace officer is seek-
ing to effect a lawful arrest or detention of himself or 
another and interferes with such arrest or detention 
by use of force or by use of any weapon. 1981 
76-8-305. Interference with arresting officer. 
A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if he has knowledge, or by the 
exercise of reasonable care should have knowledge, that a peace officer is 
seeking to effect a lawful arrest or detention of that person or another and 
interferes with the arrest or detention by: 
(1) use of force or any weapon; 
(2) the arrested person's refiisal to perform any act required by lawful 
order: 
(a) necessary to effect the arrest or detention; and 
(b) made by a peace officer involved in the arrest or detention; or 
(3) the arrested person's or another person's refusal to refrain from 
performing any act that would impede the arrest or detention. 
History: C. 1953, 76*305, enacted by L. "that person" for "himselT in the introductory 
1981, ch. 62, § 1; 1990, ch. 274, § 1. language, added the subsection designation (1), 
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amend- added Subsections (2) and (3), and made stylis-
ment, effective April 23, 1990, substituted tic changes. 
76-9-102. Disorderly conduct. 
(1) A person is guilty of disorderly conduct if: 
(a) He refuses to comply with the lawful order of the police to move from 
a public place, or knowingly creates a hazardous or physically offensive 
condition, by any act which serves no legitimate purpose; or 
(b) Intending to cause public inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm, or 
recklessly creating a risk thereof: 
(i) He engages in fighting or in violent, tumultuous, or threatening 
behavior; or 
(ii) He makes unreasonable noises in a public place; or 
(iii) He makes unreasonable noises in a private place which can be 
heard in a public place; or 
(iv) He engages in abusive or obscene language or makes obscene 
gestures in a public place; or 
(v) He obstructs vehicular or pedestrian traffic. 
(2) "Public place," for the purpose of this section, means any place to which 
the public or a substantial group of the public has access and includes but is 
not limited to streets, highways, and the common areas of schools, hospitals, 
apartment houses, office buildings, transport facilities, and shops. 
(3) Disorderly conduct is a class C misdemeanor if the offense continues 
after a request by a person to desist. Otherwise it is an infraction. 
76-9-701. Intoxication — Release of arrested person or 
placement in detoxification center. 
(1) A person is guilty of intoxication if he is under the influence of 
intoxicating liquor, a controlled substance, or any substance having the 
property of releasing toxic vapors, to a degree that the person may endanger 
himself or another, in a public place or in a private place where he unreason-
ably disturbs other persons. 
(2) A peace officer or a magistrate may release from custody an individual 
arrested under this section if he believes imprisonment is unnecessary for the 
protection of the individual or another; or a peace officer may take the arrested 
person to a detoxification center or other special facility as an alternative to 
incarceration or release from custody. 
(3) An offense under this section is a class C misdemeanor. 
77-17-10. Court to determine law; the jury, the facts. 
(1) In a jury trial, questions of law are to be determined by the court, 
questions of fact by the jury. 
(2) The jury may find a general verdict which includes questions of law as 
well as fact but they are bound to follow the law as stated by the court. 
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DANNY RAY 6RIE60, : 
Defendant. : 
INSTRUCTION NO. 1 
You are instructed that the defendant DANNY RAY GRIEGO is 
charged by the Information which has been duly filed with the 
commission of INTERFERENCE WITH A PEACE OFFICER MAKING A LAWFUL 
ARREST. CRIMINAL MISCHIEF AND ASSAULT BY A PRISONER (TWO COUNTSU 
The Information alleges: 
COUNT I 
INTERFERENCE WITH A PEACE OFFICER MAKING A LAWFUL ARREST, a 
Class B Misdemeanor, at 2395 East 4500 South, in Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, on or about July 15, 1992, in violation of Title 76, 
Chapter 8, Section 305, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in 
that the defendant, DANNY RAY GRIEGO^ a party to the offense, did 
have knowledge, or by the exercise of reasonable care should have 
had knowledge, that a peace officer was seeking to effect a lawful 
arrest or detention of defendant or another person, and did 
interfere with said arrest or detention by refusing to perform any 
act required by a lawful order made by a peace officer involved in 
the arrest or detention, and necessary to effect the arrest or 
detention. 
COUNT II 
CRIMINAL MISCHIEF, a Class C Misdemeanor, at 2395 East 4500 
South, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or about July 15, 
1992, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 6, Section 106, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant, DANNY RAY 
GRIEGO, a party to the offense, intentionally damaged, defaced, or 
destroyed the property of Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office, 
causing a pecuniary loss to Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office of 
less than $250 in value, 
COUNT III 
ASSAULT BY A PRISONER, a Third Degree Felony, at 2395 East 
4500 South, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or about July 
15, 1992, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 5, Section 102.5, Utah 
Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant, DANNY RAY 
GRIEGO, a party to the offense, was a prisoner in the custody of a 
peace officer pursuant to lawful arrest, and assaulted Deputy 
Bertram, intending to do bodily injury to Deputy Bertram, with 
unlawful force or violence. 
COUNT IV 
ASSAULT BY A PRISONER, a Third Degree Felony, at 2395 East 
4500 South, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or about July 
15, 1992, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 5, Section 102.5, Utah 
Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant, DANNY RAY 
GRIEGO, a party to the offense, was a prisoner in the custody of a 
peace officer pursuant to lawful arrest, and assaulted Deputy 
Haussler, intending to do bodily injury to Deputy Haussler, with 
unlawful force or violence. 
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ADDENDUM C 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
Your are instructed that a police officer may arrest a 
person for any public offense committed in the officer's 
presence. 
A police officer may also arrest a person without a warrant 
for an offense committed outside of the officer's presence when 
the officer has probable cause to believe that the person has 
committed a public offense and probable cause to believe that the 
person may conceal evidence of the commission of the offense or 
injure another person. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 
An officer has probable cause to arrest a person for a crime 
committed outside of the officer's presence when: 
1. Considering the facts known to the officer, and the 
inferences which might be fairly drawn therefrom, a reasonable and 
prudent officer in his position would be justified in believing 
that the suspect had committed the offense. 
and 
2. Considering the facts known to the officer, and the 
inferences which might be drawn therefrom
 # a reasonable and prudent 
officer in his position would be justified in believing that the 
suspect may 
(a) destroy or conceal evidence of the commission of the 
offense, or 
(b) injure another person or damage property belonging 
to another person. 
The determination of whether probable cause exists depends 
upon an examination of all the information available to the 
arresting officer in light of the circumstances as they existed at 
the time when the arrest was made. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 
You are instructed that a person may be charged with 
disorderly conduct if: 
(a) He intends to cause public inconvenience, annoyance, 
or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof; 
(i) He engages in fighting or in violent, 
tumultuous, or threatening behavior; or 
(ii) He makes unreasonable noises in a public place; 
or 
(iii) He makes unreasonable noises in a private 
place which can be heard in a public place; or 
(iv) He engages in abusive or obscene language or 
makes obscene gestures in a public place; or 
(v) He obstructs vehicular or pedestrian traffic. 
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INSTRUCTION NO.c£(r? 
You are instructed that a person may be charged with 
intoxication if he is under the influence of intoxicating liquor or 
any substance to a degree that the person may endanger himself or 
another, in a public place or in a private place where he 
unreasonably disturbs other persons. 
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ADDENDUM D 
INSTRUCTION NO V [ 
Before you can convict the defendant, Danny Ray Griego, of 
the crime of Interference With A Peace Officer Making A Lawful 
Arrest , as charged in count I of the Information, you must find 
from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, all of the 
following elements of that crime: 
1. That on or about the 15th day of July, 1992, in Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, the defendant, Danny Ray Griego, as a 
party to the offense; 
2. Did have knowledge or by the exercise of reasonable 
care should have had knowledge that a peace officer was seeking 
to effect a lawful arrest or detention of defendant or another 
person; 
3. That defendant did interfere with that arrest or 
detention by refusing to perform any act required by a lawful 
order made by a peace officer involved in the arrest or 
detention, and necessary to effect the arrest or detention. 
If, after careful consideration of all of the evidence in 
this case, you are convinced of the truth of each and every one 
of the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you 
must find the defendant guilty of Interference With A Peace 
Officer Making A Lawful Arrest as charged in count I of the 
information. If, on the other hand, you are not convinced beyond 
a reasonable doubt of any one or more of the foregoing elements, 
then you must find the defendant not guilty of count I. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. \c\ 
Before you can convict the defendant, Danny Ray Griego, of 
the crime of Assault By A Prisoner, as charged in count IV of the 
information, you must find from all of the evidence and beyond a 
reasonable doubt, each and every one of the following elements of 
that offense: 
1. That on or about the 15th day of July, 1992, in Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, the defendant, Danny Ray Griego, (a) 
attempted to do bodily injury to Deputy Haussler, or (b) 
committed an act that caused or created a substantial risk of 
bodily injury to Deputy Haussler; and 
2. That such attempt or act was committed with the intent 
to cause bodily injury; and 
3. That such attempt or act was committed with unlawful 
force or violence; and 
4. That at the time of such attempt or act, the defendant, 
Danny Ray Griego, was a prisoner. 
If, after careful consideration of all of the evidence in 
this case, you are convinced of the truth of each and every one 
of the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you 
must find the defendant guilty of Assault By A Prisoner as 
charged in count IV of the information. If, on the other hand, 
you are not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of any one or 
more of the foregoing elements, then you must find the defendant 
not guilty of count IV. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 
Before you can convict the defendant, Danny Ray Griego, of 
the crime of Assault By A Prisoner, as charged in count III of 
the information, you must find from all of the evidence and 
beyond a reasonable doubt, each and every one of the following 
elements of that offense: 
1. That on or about the 15th day of July, 1992, in Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, the defendant, Danny Ray Griego, (a) 
attempted to do bodily injury to Deputy Bertram, or (b) committed 
an act that caused or created a substantial risk of bodily injury 
to Deputy Bertram; and 
2. That such attempt or act was committed with the intent 
to cause bodily injury; and 
3. That such attempt or act was committed with unlawful 
force or violence; and 
4. That at the time of such attempt or act, the defendant, 
Danny Ray Griego, was a prisoner. 
If, after careful consideration of all of the evidence in 
this case, you are convinced of the truth of each and every one 
of the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you 
must find the defendant guilty of Assault By A Prisoner as 
charged in count III of the information. If, on the other hand, 
you are not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of any one or 
more of the foregoing elements, then you must find the defendant 
not guilty of count III. 
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